

*Visions and Revisions: New Scholars, New Interpretations*

Islam, Gender, and the Algerian Revolution for Independence

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The 2015 Charlie Hebdo and November 13<sup>th</sup> terrorist attacks have once again placed laïcité,<sup>1</sup> immigration, Islam, xenophobia and national identity in France front and center. Perceived threats to the French values of *Liberté, Égalité et Fraternité* have contributed to rising tensions concerning French national identity, the presence of religion (primarily issues relating to Islam) in the public versus private sphere, and a debate over the degree of recognition that should or should not be afforded to racial identity in a country that officially embraces a colorblind ideology. At first glance, the history of colonialism in Algeria and the 1954-1962 Algerian Revolution for Independence may seem distant in relation to current events and the societal issues presently affecting France. However, memories of France's colonial legacy have all but faded away and they continue to exist in the collective historical psyche of both France and Algeria. During the war, the French state attempted to create a "French Islam" while Algerian nationalist groups made efforts to incorporate a religious identity into an already developing nationalist movement for independence. This ultimately reveals an intertwining and complex relationship: French and Algerian alike drew on the same source to serve different purposes in hopes of creating vastly different outcomes.

Up until around 2005, interest in the war remained primarily restricted to French and Algerian spheres with the exception of what was, at the time, the go-to English language reference book on the Algerian War, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962* by Alistair Horne, written in 1977. Wider academic interest outside France and Algeria concerning the Algerian Revolution has since developed in part to ever-increasing U.S. involvement in the Middle East and in particular, the Iraq War. This development is reflected by recent publications of English-language historical works re-examining France's protracted colonial conflict in Algeria.<sup>2</sup> These contemporary historians have shifted away from a strictly linear methodological approach reflected in previous historiographical analysis of 1830-1962 Algeria and instead, they examine the war through the lens of race, gender, etc.

This gradual transition reflects methodologies influenced by the Annales school, a historiographical movement, developed during the interwar period that focused on the "interplay of geographic, economic, social, religious and political factors, and at the same time sought to recapture everyday culture".<sup>3</sup> Although French historians Lucien Febvre and Marc Bloch applied their "innovative social history" to a European context, their methods of examining how the intersectionality between various socio-economic factors influenced and shaped history as a whole clearly has influenced contemporary historiographies of the French colonial period in Algeria.<sup>4</sup>

*The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France* by Associate Professor of History at John Hopkins University Todd Shepard, *Torture and the Twilight of Empire: From Algiers to Baghdad* by Professor of Sociology at Hunter College Marnia Lazreg, and *Only Muslim: Embodying Islam in Twentieth Century France* by Assistant Professor of History at the University of Ottawa Naomi Davidson, for example, are contemporary historical works that demonstrate a transition away from a linear factual account of French colonialism in Algeria and instead, explore transnationalism and identity – concepts rooted in the Annales tradition.<sup>5</sup> A second shift is also present in these narratives: their movement away from Eurocentricism and elitism reflects ideas central to historiographical school of Subaltern Studies. Although the Subaltern studies field developed in the Indian historiographical context during the early 1980s with a concentration on “the subordinated parts of the [Indian] population who had been generally ignored in the conventional elite historiography of the Indian nation,” the general methodology of framing history from the perspective of the oppressed used by Shepard, Lazreg and Davidson remains applicable to the Algerian case.<sup>6</sup> In accordance with Subaltern thought, these examples support the “assertion that subordinate classes had not been passively mindless subjects but were ‘agents’ who possessed a political consciousness and actively made their history”.<sup>7</sup> These historiographies capture the often-ambiguous complexities surrounding race, nationalism, citizenship, and revolution spanning over a century in French Algeria.

Frequently excluded from these new re-examinations of French colonialism in Algeria and the Algerian Revolution, however, is the topic of religion – specifically Islam. Both the French state and the primary Algerian nationalist party, the *Front de Liberation National*, are generally understood as being largely secular entities. The books, *Only Muslim* by Naomi Davidson and *Burning the Veil: The Algerian War and the ‘Emancipation’ of Muslim Women 1954-1962* by Neil Macmaster, counter this accepted narrative to varying degrees by shedding light on the French Empire’s complex relationship with Islam and French attempts to construct a ‘French Islam’ that would ideally placate colonized Muslim populations while simultaneously continuing its *mission civilisatrice*, or, civilizing mission. The publication of these two books signals an important incorporation of an intersectional examination that takes into account religion, identity, gender and colonialism. An analysis of Islam in the specific context of the Algerian Revolution, however, remains to be written. Such an analysis would require, at the very least, an entire book dedicated to the subject matter and, despite the limitations of length for this paper, I hope to contribute to the wider

conversation on the role of religion in empire and more specifically, perceptions and manipulations of Islam during the Algerian Revolution for Independence. It is important to quickly note that the word ‘manipulations’ is used in a neutral sense, as both the French and FLN utilized Islam to serve their respective objectives of continued colonial domination and national liberation.

While a significant amount of secondary sources and French archival primary sources focus on France’s relation to Islam, not many sources discuss this subject matter in relation to the FLN and, as Lazreg states, “the FLN’s handling of Islam” needs further examination.<sup>8</sup> The need for an historical analysis centered on Islam and the Algerian Revolution, especially the FLN’s relationship to the religion, is also demonstrated by a lack of general information. Contemporary histories either include only a couple chapters addressing the subject and/or weave information on Islam and the war into their analysis as a means of supporting a separate and larger argument through the lens of gender, Orientalism, race, etc. And even then, the information provided tends to highlight the relationship between the French Empire and Islam while not much attention is brought to Islam and the FLN. Unfortunately, this limitation also applies to this paper due to the lack of FLN primary sources on Islam and the war in the Paris archives, although the *Centre Culturel Algérien* was immensely helpful with their collection of French-language Algerian nationalist newspapers, tracts, and letters. There were sections of primary source documents available only in Arabic and my lack of knowledge of this language served as another limitation.

There was, however, an abundance of French primary archival documents ranging from police reports to detailed analyses of North Africans and North African history through the lens of the French state. Such thorough documentation, particularly simplistic conclusions about North Africans and North African history, demonstrates to a larger degree the institutionalized process of a colonial empire claiming to possess an intimate familiarity with the Other that was developed over a century of colonial rule. The acquired colonial knowledge of Algerian society, the supposed ‘Arab mentality’ and Islam accumulated since the mid-nineteenth century are revealed in the archival documents wherein supposed experts espouse this carefully crafted colonial knowledge supported and amplified by asymmetrical power dynamics.

Keeping these primary source documents in mind, this paper will center on the ways in which Islam was used as a propaganda tool by both the French government and Algerian nationalist groups within the context of the 1954 war. It will also explore the relationship between the 19<sup>th</sup>-20<sup>th</sup> century French colonial government and Islam and analyze the presence

of Orientalism and the process of racialization within colonial French understandings of Islam and of Algerian Muslims.

*Algeria 1830-1954*

The 19<sup>th</sup> century French empire included colonies in North and South America, the Caribbean, South and East Asia, the Middle East, and Africa however, one colony stands out in as a unique case: Algeria did not become just another colony, but an integral part of France itself and it was considered as such from 1848 until 1962. In attempts to muster public and political support for his failing Bourbon Regime, King Charles X directed the initial 1830 conquest of Algeria and although he was later driven into exile that same year, the French invasion continued under Louis-Philippe. The decision to continue the military conquest reflected the growing prominence of French nationalism, which in turn, shaped the views of 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> century French politicians and historians alike regarding the relationship between empire and colony. As Jennifer Sessions, Associate Professor of History at the University of Iowa, proposes, the motive for continued colonial conquest did not stem from economic, but political drivers arising from nationalist sentiments at the end of the Franco-Prussian War. Sessions points out, “Historians found that the colonies offered little, if any net economic benefit and that empire impeded rather than promoted the development of capitalism.”<sup>9</sup>

During the mid-1870s, an influx of settlers from Alsace-Lorraine arrived in Algeria, marking the beginning of what would transform Algeria into a *colonie de peuplement* or settler colony.<sup>10</sup> That same year, Algerian Jews received citizenship through the Crémieux Decree, which “created a firm distinction between Algeria’s indigenous Muslims and Jews and confirmed the argument that Muslims were not capable of French citizenship.”<sup>11</sup>

Almost half a century after the Crémieux Decree, the Law of 1919 created provisions for Algerian Muslims to become French citizens provided that they met numerous requirements: applicants had to be older than 25, monogamous or single, have no criminal record, and “no hostile acts committed against French sovereignty”. They also could not have any religious or political affiliations that could threaten public security and were required to have a “two years residency in the same location” in addition to army service, literacy in French, and other requirements.<sup>12</sup> Additionally, the governor-general held the ultimate right of refusal to any applicant. Naomi Davidson highlights, “Algerian Muslims who qualified for full citizenship but refused to abandon their Muslim personal status, however, were now identified as indigenous citizens, a demi-naturalized status in between citizen and subject.”<sup>13</sup>

An attempt to extend rights to a larger population of indigenous Algerians came in the form of the proposed 1937 Blume-Viollette bill that would have afforded French citizenship and voting rights to 25,000 Algerians (out of a total population of six million) without requiring them to reject their Muslim status.<sup>14</sup> This measure faced strong opposition from the settler colonial lobby and ultimately failed to pass, thus demonstrating to indigenous Algerians that, despite efforts from both liberal French politicians and Algerian leaders alike, the opportunity to reach an agreement seemed highly unlikely. The colonial tactic of creating legal divisions between Algerian Muslims and Jews through the Crémieux Decree and the later requirement that demanded Algerian Muslims to renounce their faith in order to become full French citizens demonstrated a systematically legalized manipulation of religious identities which purposely sought to deny the Algerian Muslim majority equality under French law.

Meanwhile in the metropole, the French government funded the building of the Grande Mosquée de Paris by circumventing their own 1905 law, which had made it illegal for the French state to directly finance religious activities. By technically calling the mosque a ‘cultural center’, the government avoided violating the laws of laïcité through a legal loophole that reflected on a larger trending “political pattern by which the state promoted and controlled religious institutions.”<sup>15</sup> This would also allow the French state to regulate and promote a specific form of state-endorsed Islam and surveil Algerians for nationalist activity leading up to and during the Algerian Revolution for Independence.

The emergence of nationalism in Algeria was a part of a larger global trend that took place throughout the course of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, where nationalism became a tool with which “peoples of non-Western regions in general could fight off the brunt of imperialism and colonialism”.<sup>16</sup> At the end of World War II, opposition to French rule grew stronger in France’s African, Middle Eastern and Asian colonies. In Algeria, protestors gathered in the town of Sétif in a peaceful demonstration against French colonialism on Victory in Europe Day, May 8, 1945, despite prohibitions on demonstrations of a nationalist nature. While it is uncertain as to who initially fired first, the French police ended up shooting into the crowd. The police response triggered further unrest in Sétif and the surrounding towns and around one hundred settlers were killed. In return, both police and vigilante settlers carried out reprisals killing hundreds of Algerians.<sup>17</sup> What would become known as the Sétif Massacre signaled an ever-decreasing likelihood that a peaceful compromise could be reached. Two years later, the Organic Law of September 20, 1947 stated that Algerians were equal concerning race and religion but it still maintained that in order to obtain French citizenship,

Algerian Muslims would have to renounce their Muslim personal status.<sup>18</sup> By the 1950s, the Pied Noir (settler population of European origin) population had grown to nearly 1 million, which in turn complicated the possibility of an independent Algeria along with the fact that the colonial government in Algiers rejected any attempts to reforms laws that would potentially grant more rights to Algeria's indigenous population.

In 1954, France lost Indochina after the Battle of Dien Bien Phu and it brought many to the realization that France could be defeated. On November 1<sup>st</sup>, 1954, a new nationalist group, the Front de Liberation (FLN), took responsibility for a series of coordinated attacks in the countryside and they released their manifesto demanding unconditional independence: "We distance ourselves from any possible compromise and offer the possibility to all Algerian patriots, from all social milieus, to all parties and movements that are wholly Algerian, to integrate themselves into the struggle for liberation, without any other consideration<sup>19</sup>." After nearly a decade of a protracted colonial war that resulted in the fall of the Fourth Republic, Algeria won independence from France in 1962.

### *Orientalism and Racial Profiling*

France's relationship to Islam, Algerians, and Algerian nationalism was greatly shaped by impressions from earlier 19<sup>th</sup> century colonial encounters in North Africa, which developed into what Edward Said characterized as "a relationship of power, domination, of varying degrees of complex hegemony..." Colonial powers would in turn, produce "a body of theory and practice in which there has been a considerable material investment."<sup>20</sup> While 'Orientalizing' the Other was and remains complex and multi-faceted, this section will specifically focus on the French process of othering Algerians and Islam - a centuries-long process that included what we might characterize today as racializing Algerian Muslims while simultaneously co-opting and promoting a 'French Islam' ever since the initial invasion of Algiers in 1830.<sup>21</sup>

Promoting Orientalist tropes that would develop into a set of highly racialized characterizations of Muslims was key in establishing popular support for the 1830 invasion of Algiers and, as Shepard states, "ultraroyalist supporters presented the Algiers expedition to the French public as a confrontation between Oriental despotism and Christian monarchy..."<sup>22</sup> Newspapers, such as the *Moniteur Universel*, characterized Islam as a reason for Oriental despotism. Accordingly, Dey Hussain, as a Muslim, recognized "no other law than force, active and present force."<sup>23</sup> Seeing Muslims as inherently different and inferior did not fade away or change with time but instead informed many of the counterrevolutionary

tactics the French police and army would employ during the Algerian Revolution over a century later. This very idea that Muslims would only respond to brute force reflected a larger systematic colonial pattern of dehumanizing colonized populations and justifying various forms of colonial violence acted out against them.

At the end of World War II, North African laborers began settling in France instead of returning to Algeria, Tunisia, or Morocco and, bringing their families with them greatly increased France's number of North African inhabitants.<sup>24</sup> French police notes on North African immigrants offer insight on not only how they were viewed by the French state but also the ways in which French Orientalist notions developed in the mid 19<sup>th</sup> century continued to be consistently reiterated and reinforced. The following is a report excerpt from the Paris Prefecture of Police in 1951, three years before the start of the Algerian Revolution:

The North African mentality is characterized by instant changes in impulse, which are unpredictable and violent. Why such instability? First and foremost, physiological reasons: inadequate amounts of food and a lack of hygiene both here in Europe and in their own countries. The psychological reasons: the new environment that they now find themselves submerged in is so different from their places of origin that they have to acquire large amounts of knowledge quickly. They are not any more prepared for our way of life than we are for receiving them.<sup>25</sup>

This psychological synopsis analyses North Africans as being emotionally unstable and identifies the societies from which they came as being one of the root causes for their 'primitive backwardness'. The report underlines differences between North Africans and Europeans in terms of dichotomies which Edward Said states as a polarizing distinction where "the Oriental becomes more Oriental, the Westerner more Western..."<sup>26</sup> Also included in this same document is the acknowledgement of increasingly anti-French sentiments: "And it should also be noted, in this domain, the presence of an influence which is becoming more and more profoundly harmful: Anti-French propaganda."<sup>27</sup> According to these police notes, 'the North African' is already predisposed to "pass absolute and definitive judgments on Europeans", a prejudice reflex that is rooted in an "ancestral hatred for 'roumi', or Christians, ... and nearly impossible to improve [reverse]."<sup>28</sup> The citation of religiously-based hatred on the part of the Muslim individual, toward Europeans adds an additional dimension to the document's already dichotomous nature by linking concepts of racial and ethnic inferiority with religious identity, and in this case, Muslim identity. It absolves the colonial system of any guilt by referencing an ingrained religious animosity as the reason for any North African disdain against the French.

Another similar 1958 document, also from the Prefecture of Police, highlights the supposed primitiveness of North Africans, portraying them as trapped in a world lagging centuries and centuries behind. It additionally dismisses what it categorizes as perceived racial discrimination on the part of the North African individual as simply a consequence of a defensive reflex unique to Muslims that developed from complete isolation:

The Muslim, barely having just emerged from the calm of his *djebel* where life passes by at almost a biblical pace and has nothing in common with the frightful rhythm of Paris where he now finds himself immersed almost overnight, believes he is the victim of racial discrimination resulting from an automatic defense reflex.<sup>29</sup>

These reports show a process of racializing North Africans and Muslims through a set of generalizing Orientalist tropes. It is important to point out that French authorities often used ‘Muslim’, ‘North Africans’ or ‘Algerians’ interchangeably, thus continuing to conflate national and religious identities and to maintain them [Algerians] as a separate and distinct population.<sup>30</sup>” Furthermore, the reason for disparities between North African and European societies is, according to the reports, an inherent inferiority of North Africans which ultimately is responsible for setbacks North African Muslims may experience when living in France. After living in France for an extended period of time however, the North African’s Muslim identity undergoes a transformation. Upon arrival, Muslims are “impregnated with a religion that regulates every aspect of their lives, they arrive in country with a different religious tradition where their own religion no longer appears in everyday life.” This is described as a disorienting experience where the “difference between his [the North African] civilization and ours [the French] creates in him a disturbing sense of disequilibrium.”<sup>31</sup> However, this Muslim identity may begin to fade with time according to an excerpt from a 1961 police report titled “Some Notes on Algerian Muslims in the Department of the Seine”:

Although the Muslim finds in the Qur’an all the regulations for daily living, once in the metropole, he no longer practices his religion. There are two mosques in the department of the Seine...yet he is nowhere to be seen during the Friday communal prayers. Barely 200-250 Muslims attend this prayer and among them, there are few Algerians. Algerian Muslims don’t remember they are Muslims unless it is during a marriage ceremony or burial...In fact, Algerians, even though their religion is mixed with unorthodox practices originating from the old ages, feel deeply Muslim...<sup>32</sup>

It reveals a set of colonial conceptions concerning how Muslims should practice their religion and it highlights French efforts to set the degree of religiosity Muslims must display in order to be considered as ‘practicing Muslim’ according to French standards which also

seemed to claim authenticity in determining what was or was not orthodox Islam. In other words, these conclusions drawn out in the report speak to the larger colonial state's tendency to view Islam and Islamic practices as one-dimensional and monolithic while also promoting a 'French Islam'. Additionally, the report offers a simplistic answer as to why Algerians did not regularly attend services at the two mosques in Paris: they simply lacked religious conviction due to a loss of Muslim identity even though the religion nonetheless remained deeply engrained. However, in reality, reasons for not attending certain mosques, especially those tied to the French state like the Mosquée de Paris, were more complicated.

Within Paris, police would often surveil the Grande Mosquée de Paris for nationalist activity, which largely took place not inside the mosque itself but outside along the streets as noted by a December 15, 1954 police note:

The leaders of the ex-MTD decided to organize on December 16, 1954 a day of national protest against repression in Algeria. This day resulted in a gathering of believers at the Paris mosque from 3-4PM.<sup>33</sup>

Another report from Director General of the Municipal to the Prefect of Police dated March 1956 brought up the concern of demonstrations at the mosque:

Although a debate is taking place in the National Assembly concerning the situation in Algeria, other similar [nationalist] movements have invited North-Africans in the Paris vicinity to meet at the Paris Mosque March 9 at 1 PM.<sup>34</sup>

As demonstrated by the Paris police notes, multiple Algerian nationalist groups saw the Mosquée de Paris as a convenient and already semi-politicized space to stage public protests against French colonialism. These gatherings were a repeating occurrence throughout the course of the war. In such a highly politicized environment where French police kept the area under continuous surveillance, the absence of a large number of Algerian attendees would make sense. Naomi Davidson proposes that seeing a lack of attendance at Paris mosques "was interpreted, rightly or wrongly, as opposition to either the site's vision of Islam or to French colonialism."<sup>35</sup> These reasons most likely accounted for the perceived disappearance of Algerians' 'Muslimness'. The police reports, however, make no allusions to any of these more complicated explanations and instead, they opt for simplistic conclusions to explain the less public display of Algerian religious identity in the metropole. Interestingly despite French commitments to *laïcité*, at least at the theoretical level, they defined Algerians

religiosity through their lack of public participation in religious gatherings such as the weekly *salat al jumu'a*.

The FLN, on the other hand, is generally thought of as being a largely secular entity that concentrated on forming and promoting a unified secular national identity. This is true to a certain degree but the FLN *did* pay attention to the significance of religious identities. Presenting a cohesive force against French colonialism meant including the Algerian Jewish minority as compatriots: In a special edition of *El Moudjahid*, the FLN's underground newspaper, an article entitled "L'Antisemitisme, Cheval de Bataille du Colonialisme" or "Anti-Semitism: The Warhorse of Colonialism" identified "anti-Semitic sentiments" as an "import of French colonialism" and that "Algerian Jews loyal to Algeria were brothers."<sup>36</sup> The editorial references anti-Semitic persecution against Jews in Europe and juxtaposes it with religious tolerance in Algeria, "For 20 centuries, Jews have lived in Algeria. At a time when they faced the worst forms of persecution in Europe, North Africa, the land of tolerance, welcomed them as they were chased out of Spain."<sup>37</sup>

In an official letter to the Rabbi of Algiers, the FLN proposed an ultimatum:

It is because the FLN considers Algerian Jews as sons of our country that we hope the leaders of the Jewish community will have the wisdom to contribute to the construction of a free and truly fraternal Algeria...it is the duty and of course in the interest of the entire Jewish community to condemn without fail the dying French colonial regime, and to proclaim their choice of Algerian nationality.<sup>38</sup>

The FLN's relationship with the Algerian Jews is significant; it demonstrates resistance to falling into the colonial tactic of 'divide and conquer' can be compared and contrasted with the FLN's approach towards Algerian Muslims who, like Algerian Jews, were handed ultimatums to engage in the anti-colonial struggle for independence. The fact that Algerian Muslims were the minority led to the FLN's linking of 'Algerian' to 'Muslim' - just as French authorities had done.<sup>39</sup> This gradual forging of Algerian and Muslim identity on the part of both the French and FLN led to the unfortunate exclusion of Algerian Jews, who ultimately left Algeria for France by the end of the war.

Muslim identity was central to the nationalist cause - as demonstrated by the FLN's November 1, 1954 Proclamation:

It is our estimation that...we can count on the diplomatic support of our Arab and Muslim brothers.

Goal: Nationalist Independence by – The restoration of the sovereign, democratic, and social Algerian state, within the framework of Islamic Principles. The respect of all fundamental liberties without distinction of race or religion

External Objectives: The realization of North African unity within its natural Arab-Islamic framework.<sup>40</sup>

Incorporating Pan-Arabism into its political message and linking Islam to Algerian nationalism established early-on the FLN's conception of Algeria as a predominately Arab-Muslim nation that would ideally respect racial and religious minority groups once achieving independence. The FLN tended to “surrender religious affairs and justice during the war to the clerics” as opposed to selecting revolutionary leaders to replace local clerics.<sup>41</sup> FLN recruitment in rural villages sometimes contained religious elements. When recruiting, FLN leader, Azzedine, whose full name is not recorded, would state, “You are good Muslims, ready to sacrifice your property, your sons, and your lives. We knew it. Do you agree to contribute to the liberation of Algeria?”<sup>42</sup> By impressing upon listeners the idea that being a ‘good Muslim’ required one to join the nationalist struggle for independence, the FLN used religion as a means of recruiting and garnering support for their cause.

Frank Kearns, an American CBS News reporter, travelled to Eastern Algeria to report on the war from the ground behind FLN lines and wrote some observations on the FLN's relationship to Islam:

Except for the European minority, the Algerians are Arabs. Many think and speak French, but they're Arabs. Also they are Moslems and this is a Moslem army, through and through. So far, there's little talk of a holy war. But, here and there, you hear occasional fanatic talk of a Jee-Had, a Holy war. And it's significant that most, if not all, of the political officers are more Arab, more Moslem than the others. – August 22, 1957<sup>43</sup>

Firstly, Kearns' insights on the war were significant because American interest and involvement in Algeria was quite limited. At the time, wider American involvement in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region did not parallel that of either the French or British. Unlike the United States, these European nations had a long historical relationship with North African and Middle Eastern nations. While true objectivity is impossible, Kearns' status as an ‘outsider’ allowed him to offer a fresh perspective on the war. The fact that his writing includes observations that characterized the FLN as a “Moslem army, through and through” demonstrates that Islam had, at the very least, a significant enough presence that it was noticeable to an American journalist. He was, however, careful to highlight that jihad

was not central to the independence struggle against the French, thus demonstrating that the FLN's fight was neither rooted in religious ideology nor cloaked in religious terminology. The association between 'Arab' and 'Muslim' that appears in Kearns' entry, notably his assertion that 'more Arab' equaled 'more Muslim', further reveals a process of racializing Algerian Muslims even outside of the French colonial context.

In France, the Fédération Française du Front de Libération Nationale (FFLN) worked to isolate Algerians to varying degrees and regulate their everyday lives. Davidson states that before Ramadan, the FFLN "spread the word that all Algerians were to observe the fast and that they were prepared to enforce these orders."<sup>44</sup> The nationalist group also attempted to intimidate bar owners from selling alcohol and they would sometimes stand outside of the Grande Mosquée de Paris to distribute political fliers. Davidson characterizes these actions as attempts to construct and maintain a distinct Algerian identity through the promotion of an *Islam Algérien* which, in many ways, paralleled the French state's promotion of an *Islam Français*.<sup>45</sup> The French, however, had at their disposal a wider array of financial and political resources, while the FFLN "Had not physical embodiment of *Islam algérien* to testify to its power to define Islam from Algerians living in the capital."<sup>46</sup>

*The French State, the FLN and other Nationalist Groups: Islam, Gender and Politics*

When pieced together, it becomes clear how French characterizations of North Africans and more specifically, Algerian Muslims, as being backwards, primitive, violent, intellectually and culturally inferior, and weak-minded, impressionable individuals, shaped the often-gendered French state propaganda campaigns during the Algerian Revolution. These propaganda campaigns relied on two primary conclusions about Muslims: Algerian Muslim men were violent and oppressive and Algerian women were victims who lacked agency and needed Western values to liberate them.

Gender and religion overlapped culminated in pertaining to the veil, where "Algeria's Muslim women, quickly became central to French efforts to win the larger war of international opinion."<sup>47</sup> Although the French government promoted the argument that Algerian women desired liberation from certain conservative customs, this idea originated from Algerian Muslim women themselves in the early 1950s.<sup>48</sup> Columns of the *Jeunesse de l'Union Démocratique du Manifeste Algérien* (JUDEMA) featured several interviews with Egyptian feminists who addressed the issue of the veil: "The veil is a rampart that is absolutely necessary for Arab women to climb over if they wish to definitively emancipate

themselves from the tight restrictions of imperialism."<sup>49</sup> In accordance with Egyptian feminists, Algerian women- usually younger and educated, expressed their thoughts in columns: Fadila Ahmed, an Algerian feminist, wrote:

We Algerian women have two jailors: colonialism...and those listless beings who cling to the customs and traditions inherited, not from Islam, but from their ignorant fathers. The second jailor is worse than the first.<sup>50</sup>

While the young feminist Algerian women like Fadila credited local customs, not Islam, for the imposing gendered restrictions, the French did not make such distinctions when they began their propaganda war against the FLN. In their minds, Algerian Muslim women lacked agency and were dominated by their husbands, their culture and their religion. 'Liberating' the Algerian woman was viewed as a potentially effective means of undermining the Algerian nationalist cause by showcasing France as a benevolent liberator. However this strategy relied heavily on the gendered conception that women represent the nation - more specifically, the purity of the nation.<sup>51</sup>

One of the more well-known French propaganda pieces aimed at 'liberating' Algerian Muslim women from the veil is a poster showing an obscured veiled figure who is transformed into a happy smiling woman with the words "N'êtes vous donc pas jolie? *Aren't you beautiful? Dévoilez-vous! Remove your veil!*" This propaganda poster from the 1950s reveals much about French perceptions of Algerian women, women in general and French notions concerning the *mission civilisatrice*. If anything represented the divide between French and European and indigenous Algerian populations, it was the veil – a tangible marker that embodied overly-simplified colonialist dichotomies between Europeans and Muslims. It also elicited orientalist notions about North African women's sexuality and their supposedly 'exotic' aura.

Colonialist propaganda considered the action of a woman removing her veil as a sign that she wished to assimilate by casting away a vestige of Muslim backwardness and trading it for modernization and the 'civilized' world. While these propaganda campaigns may have had at least some emotional appeal to those who thought this truly was a battle of hearts and minds, there existed a much more calculated approach: eradicating the traditional practice of veiling was a part of a greater psychological war waged against the FLN.<sup>52</sup> The objective of this anti-subversive strategy was to first isolate women from their communities, which would in turn, create an opening to deconstruct the population and then restructure it from within

through newly ‘liberated’ Algerian Muslim women.<sup>53</sup> This approach reflected the mentality of ‘Win over the women and the rest will follow’ – a concept that viewed women, who were assumed to be the nucleus of the family, as more prone to outside influence.<sup>54</sup>

However, removing the veil, or *haïk*, did not always symbolize the liberation of ‘oppressed Muslim women’: French soldiers would also force women suspected of working with the FLN to unveil “as a tool to humiliate them, particularly in the countryside.”<sup>55</sup>

In 1958, a *New York Times Magazine* article “identified a new front in the French government’s struggle with the FLN: ‘The Battle of the Veil’.”<sup>56</sup> The French government shifted attention to the veil partly to avoid accountability for their colonial policies and instead stressed that, “the real enemy were those who rejected the modernization that France promised.”<sup>57</sup> Algerian women became pawns in a French PR campaign designed to prove to the international community the validity of French claims stating that they simply wanted to free the oppressed. While religion was not always referenced in discourses surrounding the veil, the persistent image of the ‘oppressed Muslim veiled woman’ served as a visual reminder that it was “a sign both of all that was alien, pre-modern and regressive in Muslim and Arab cultures.”<sup>58</sup>

During the Battle of Algiers, Algerian women militants were particularly valuable because French soldiers would often mistake them for civilians. The Battle of Algiers began when the FLN decided to move the war to the capital city of Algiers in 1957. Before 1957, fighting mostly remained restricted to the countryside and mountainous region of Kabylie. In response to the guillotining of two Algerian FLN members in France, Saadi Yacef, head of the FLN branch in Algiers, began carrying out random attacks in the city. He forbade the killing of women, children and the elderly restricting possible targets to Pied Noir males between eighteen and fifty-four.<sup>59</sup>

On August 10<sup>th</sup>, the French police planted a bomb inside a building in the Casbah where FLN members were supposedly hiding. The death toll rose into the seventies with women and children among the casualties. In response, Yacef recruited four women, Hassiba Ben Bouali, Zohra Drif, Djamila Bouhired and Samia Lakhdari, to slip past French paramilitary checkpoints setup around the barbed-wire perimeter that fenced in the Casbah.<sup>60</sup> The plan relied heavily on two factors: these women’s gender and French assumptions about Muslim women.

In *A Dying Colonialism*, written during the war in 1959, Frantz Fanon describes manipulating identity through veiling and unveiling as a revolutionary act:

Carrying revolvers, grenades, hundreds of false identity cards or bombs, the unveiled Algerian woman moves like a fish in the Western waters. The soldiers, the French patrols, smile to her as she passes...no one suspects that her suitcases contain the automatic pistol which will presently mow down four or five members of one of the patrols...Removed and reassumed again and again, the veil has been manipulated, transformed into a technique of camouflage, into a means of struggle.<sup>61</sup>

The example of the Battle of Algiers and Fanon's writings indicate that French military officers frequently profiled young Arab men while overlooking Algerian women. Removing the veil to engage in guerilla warfare was, as Fanon stated, a revolutionary act within itself and it demonstrates how the FLN used French assumptions about Muslim women to their advantage. While Fanon helped bring to light women's contributions, it is important include a perspective that is written not *about* Algerian Muslim women but written *by* an Algerian Muslim woman herself.

On November 1, 1960 special edition of *El Moudjahid*, the FLN's clandestine newspaper, featured an interview with an anonymous militant Algerian woman from a middle class educated background. The ways in which gender, Muslim identity and class intersected are apparent:

El Moudjahid: Who were you in contact with when you were a militant?

Response: With Algerians and also Algerian women of European descent.<sup>62</sup> My participation in the organization was, for some *Oranais*<sup>63</sup> not already engaged in the war, surprising because I was a young woman who had chosen to leave my family and live in secrecy...we were arrested in the early morning and this caught the public's attention because we were Algerian Muslims and Europeans fighting together. The police were surprised that I was a "Muslim intellectual". They tried to convince us with propaganda that said France wanted to liberate Muslim women, etc...<sup>64</sup>

As described by the interviewee, the French police were most shocked by the fact that a woman, particularly a Muslim woman, could be an intellectual yet despite this, it appears that they nonetheless tried to convince her that France truly wished to liberate Algerian Muslim women. The narrator's self-identification as a "Muslim intellectual" indicates that her religious identity and level of education as well as class status were important to her. Although this is speculation, her decision to highlight these qualities may have been influenced by her view of herself as a woman who defied both Orientalist and gendered presumptions of women. More generally speaking, the negative public reaction to an alliance between Muslim Algerians and Europeans reflects the unsurprising fact that these two populations were quite divided at the time. It also shows that the Algerians were

automatically labeled as Muslim - the antithesis to European identity -which is why it would have been particularly noticeable when these two groups sided together in support of independence.

Towards the end of the interview, this young woman underlines the contributions that women have made to the war:

We knew that all Algerian women participated in this country's reconstruction. Because of their role in society, we believed that they had rights that would be more widely recognized since they had participated in the collective struggle for independence.<sup>65</sup>

Although *El Moudjahid's* inclusion of a female militant's perspective demonstrates the presence of a more progressive attitude towards women, the FLN, like the French, was also culpable for propagating the same gendered myth that women (in this case Algerian Muslim women) were the "bastion of Algerian social and religio-cultural identity".<sup>66</sup> While Fanon focused solely on women's contributions to the struggle for independence and stopped there, this female militant linked the fact that women participated in the struggle with an expectation that women should receive more widely recognized rights. The fact that she raised this issue reflects potential fears that her and other women's contributions would be forgotten by the FLN. It also indicates that Algerian women had limited independence before the war but hoped to see changes that would further advance women's rights.

A rival Algerian nationalist group, the *Mouvement National Algérien*, also featured an 1960 article in their own newspaper, *La Voix du Peuple*, concerning Algerian Muslim women's participation in combat:

This interesting involvement of Algerian Muslim women in combat will undoubtedly liberate her and the country in a process that is worthy of attention. We began to see young women enroll in universities; the MNA organized these young women with the intention of building the foundation for the elite class of tomorrow. Women engaged in the fight for independence by becoming the head of the family where they replaced their fathers, their husbands and their brothers. They also joined the *maquis*<sup>67</sup>...faced torture and personally suffered...they are liberated through political and revolutionary struggle. It is within this framework of our historical past, our civilization and the Islamic religion that we will draw on to perfect the evolution of Algerian Muslim women. The future is ours ... both men and Algerian Muslim women can be proud of having claimed their place through combat by participating in national liberation.<sup>68</sup>

This article acknowledges the multiple roles Muslim women took on during the war as well as their full engagement in combat and personal sacrifices they gave. Simply

referring to these women as ‘Algerian’ would have implied that they were Muslim by default, but the importance of explicitly stating their religious identity may have been intended to counter French propaganda on Muslim women that would have also appeared during this time. Additionally, it serves as evidence of the forging of national and religious identity into a single entity.

The *El Moudjahid* interview and this *Voix du Peuple* article suggest that regardless of inner nationalist political conflict, Algerian nationalist groups recognized the importance of acknowledging Muslim women’s contributions - motivations that stemmed from various reasons: the need to counter colonial propaganda to make women feel appreciated for their efforts, and to acknowledge women just enough that it would give the impression that they were more progressive than they actually were.

Whether women used the *haïk* to transport weapons or removed it to travel throughout a city undetected, their ability to identify the French military’s gender-based weakness highlights the ways in which changing one’s Muslim identity via physical presentation was a successful strategy. However, their battle was not solely against colonialism, as they had to simultaneously struggle for their rights within the developing nationalist framework – a framework that placed women’s rights secondary to independence without acknowledging the fact that these were intertwined and tended to favor patriarchal traditions when convenient.

### *Conclusion*

An examination of the French state’s and FLN’s relationship to Islam reveals that both parties’ approach in engaging with religion often changed with the circumstances as the war progressed. While France is associated with a strict *laïcité*, it would, however, frequently promote a ‘French Islam’ through state-sponsored religious sites such as the Grande Mosquée de Paris while simultaneously justifying forms of physical and psychological colonial violence with Orientalist tropes of indigenous Muslim populations. Within the metropole, the police would racially profile any person who ‘looked’ North African; the police archive documents presented in this paper reveal that generalizing psychological sketches of the Maghrebin (North African) population based on set perceptions of Islam and supposed typical Muslim behavior were systematically institutionalized. When it came to military propaganda campaigns, the French military portrayed the French colonial power as a benevolent liberator of ‘oppressed’ Muslim women despite its uses of rape, torture, and forced unveiling as counterrevolutionary tactics of warfare. For the FLN, Islam was linked to

nationalism and was, to a certain degree, promoted as being central to a newly emerging Algerian identity. As demonstrated by the French, the FLN also adjusted its relationship to Islam depending on specific circumstances: when dealing with urban populations, it would place more emphasis on the compatibility of progressive values and Islamic principles while in the rural areas, it tailored its message to appeal to a more traditional audience who placed importance on maintaining cultural and religious customs.<sup>69</sup>

The legacy of the Algerian War, France's long-term suspicion of Islam, the visible difference what the "native (white) French thought they saw between themselves and these new (immigrant) strangers prevented the repetition of the standard immigration story."<sup>70</sup> Manu Saadia, an author, analyzed the implications of the fact that several of the perpetrators of the November 13, 2015 terrorist attacks possessed French citizenship, "Friday's attacks in Paris, reportedly carried out by ISIS-affiliated extremists, are part of this long history of post-colonial tension. The attacks appear to have been directly related to the ongoing civil war in Syria. However, the French citizenship of at least some of the perpetrators reminds us that these attacks can hardly be disentangled from France's colonial past. That past, which has produced resentment and trauma on both sides of the Algerian War divide, still haunts the present."<sup>71</sup> Legal, political and psychological legacies of French colonialism and the Algerian Revolution clearly have not faded with time: if anything, current unrest in France has unearthed hidden animosities and tensions rooted in past centuries of French colonial rule in Algeria. Revisiting this colonial history and France's relationship to Islam may provide the opportunity to gain a more nuanced understanding of the past and its continued effect on the present.

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<sup>1</sup> The French concept of secularism

<sup>2</sup> Davidson, Naomi. *Only Muslim: Embodying Islam in Twentieth Century France* (New York: Cornell University Press, 2012). Shepard, Todd. *The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France* (Ithaca: Cornell University, 2006). Brower, Benajim. *A Desert Named Peace: The violence of France's Empire in the Algerian Sahara, 1844-1902* (New York: Columbia University Press 2009). Sessions, Jennifer. *By Sword and Plow: France and the Conquest of Algeria* (New York: Cornell University Press 2011.)

<sup>3</sup> George Iggers, Q. Edward Want, Supriya Mukherjee, *A Global History of Modern Historiography* (United Kingdom, Pearson Education 2008), 186.

<sup>4</sup> Iggers et al., *A Global History of Modern Historiography*, 187.

<sup>5</sup> Iggers et al., *A Global History of Modern Historiography*, 188.

<sup>6</sup> Iggers et al., *A Global History of Modern Historiography*, 285.

<sup>7</sup> Iggers et al., *A Global History of Modern Historiography*, 285.

<sup>8</sup> Lazreg, Marnia. *Torture and the Twilight of Empire: From Algiers to Baghdad* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 191.

<sup>9</sup> Sessions, Jennifer E. *By Sword and Plow: France and the conquest of Algeria* (New York: Cornell University Press, 2011) 10.

<sup>10</sup> They arrived after the 1871 Treaty of Frankfurt gave Germany the majority of the Alsace-Lorraine region at the end of the Prussian War

<sup>11</sup> Davidson, Naomi. *Only Muslim: Embodying Islam in Twentieth-Century France* (New York: Cornell University Press, 2012), 27.

<sup>12</sup> Davidson. *Only Muslim*, 229.

<sup>13</sup> Davidson. *Only Muslim*, 27.

<sup>14</sup> Martin and Phillips. *Algeria: Anger of the Dispossessed*, 48.

<sup>15</sup> Bowen, John R. *Why the French Don't Like Headscarves: Islam, the State and Public Space*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 37.

<sup>16</sup> George Iggers et al. *A Global History of Modern Historiography*, 194.

<sup>17</sup> Davidson. *Only Muslim*, 90.

<sup>18</sup> Davidson. *Only Muslim*, 90.

<sup>19</sup> Shepard, Todd. *Voices of Decolonization: A Brief History with Documents*, "National Liberation Front Proclamation Nov. 1, 1954," (Bedford/St. Martin's, 2015), 96.

<sup>20</sup> Said, Edward. *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage Books Edition, 1979), 5-6.

<sup>21</sup> Khyati Josh describes racialization as: "The racialization of religion occurs through multiple processes, involves multiple agents, and leads to multiple outcomes. Ultimately, racialization results in essentialism; it reduces people to one aspect of their identity and thereby presents a homogeneous, undifferentiated, and static view of an ethno religious community." Josh, Khyati. 2006. "The Racialization of Hinduism, Islam, and Sikhism in the United States." *Equity & Excellence In Education* 39, no. 3: 211-226. *Education Research Complete*, EBSCOhost (accessed March 23, 2017), 212.

<sup>22</sup> Sessions. *By Sword and Plow*, 29.

<sup>23</sup> Sessions. *By Sword and Plow*, 32.

<sup>24</sup> Bowen. *Why the French Don't Like Headscarves*, 66.

<sup>25</sup> Les Archives de la Préfecture Police (APP) H7

*Préfecture de la Police Direction de la Police Judiciaire Cabinet du Directeur Paris le 22 nov. 1951* by 'Le Directeur de la Police Judiciaire' "Le problème Nord-africain" 4-5

Original French text: « On a remarqué que la mentalité des nord-africains se caractérisait par des changements instantanés, imprévisibles et violents. Pourquoi cette instabilité ? Tout d'abord pour des raisons physiologiques : insuffisance quantitative et qualitative de nourriture et d'hygiène, en Europe aussi bien que chez eux. Enfin, pour des raisons psychologiques : le nouveau milieu dans lequel ils se trouvent plongés est si différent de leur milieu d'origine qu'ils doivent assimiler beaucoup de connaissances rapidement. Ils ne sont pas plus préparés à notre civilisation que nous n'étions prêts à les recevoir. »

<sup>26</sup> Said. *Orientalism*, 46.

<sup>27</sup> APP H7

*Préfecture de la Police Direction de la Police Judiciaire Cabinet du Directeur Paris le 22 nov. 1951*  
by 'Le Directeur de la Police Judiciaire' "Le problème Nord-africain" 4-5

Original French text: Et ils faut citer aussi, dans ce domine, l'influence de plus en plus profonde, comme de plus en plus néfaste, des propagandes anti-française.

<sup>28</sup> APP H7

*Préfecture de la Police Direction de la Police Judiciaire Cabinet du Directeur Paris le 22 nov. 1951*  
by 'Le Directeur de la Police Judiciaire' "Le problème Nord-africain" 4-5

Original French text: Il porte des jugements absolus et définitifs sur les européens qu'il soumet à une observation constante. Son esprit critique semble faire revivre l'ancestrale haine du 'roumi'. Cette tendance fâcheuse qui va le conduire de la dissimulation au mensonge rend impossible tout perfectionnement.

<sup>29</sup>APP H9

*Étude de la Population Musulmane d'Algérie Implantée à Paris et dans la Région Parisienne depuis la Libération Préfecture de Police Cabinet Dec. 15, 1958, 20*

Original French text: Le Musulman, à peine sorti du calme de son djebel où la vie se déroule à un rythme et sur un mode presque encore biblique et qui n'ont on aucune façon rien de commun avec le rythme effrayant de l'existence parisienne dans laquelle il est plongé du jour au lendemain, est amené automatiquement par réflexe de défense à croire victime d'une discrimination raciale. »

<sup>30</sup> Davidson. *Only Muslim*, 160.

<sup>31</sup> APP H9

*Quelques notes sur les Algériens Musulmans dans le Département de la Seine Commandant Berenguier Janvier, 1961. 55-58*

Original French text: Imprégné d'une religion qui règle tous les actes de sa vie, il arrive dans un milieu de religion différente et où celle-ci n'apparaît pas dans la vie quotidienne. Déjà dans son village ou son douar isolé dans la montagne ou sur les plateaux, cet homme a ressenti, la plupart du temps inconsciemment, la différence entre sa civilisation et la notre dont l'influence s'étend et il en a éprouvé comme une gêne qui le déséquilibre... En apparence les Algériens musulmans ne se souviennent qu'ils sont musulmans, qu'au moment du mariage et surtout d'un enterrement... En fait, les Algériens, même si leur religion est mêlée de pratiques peu orthodoxes remontant aux anciens âges, se sentent profondément musulmans...

<sup>32</sup> APP H9 *Quelques notes sur les Algériens Musulmans dans le Département de la Seine Commandant Berenguier Janvier, 1961. 55-58*

Original French text: Bien que le Musulman trouve dans le Coran toutes ses règles de vie, une fois en métropole, il ne suit que de loin les pratiques de sa religion. Dans le département de la Seine existent deux mosquées... On n'y voit pas le vendredi, à la prière en commun. C'est à peine si 200 à 250 Musulmans se rendent à cette prière et parmi eux il y a peu d'Algériens.

<sup>33</sup> APP HA

*Note de Service N 250-54 Paris, 15 December 1954. 34*

Original French text: Les responsables de l'ex MTLD<sup>33</sup> ont décidées d'organiser, le 16 décembre 1954, une 'journée natioinale de protestation contre la repression en Aglerie. Cette journée doit notamment se manifester de la façon suivante: Rassemblement des fideles à la Mosquée de Paris, de 15 heures à 16 heures..."

<sup>34</sup> APP HA

*Object: Compte-rendu de la manifestation du 9 Mars, 10 Mars 1956. 34*

Original French text: " Alors qu'un débat est en cours à l'Assemblée Natioinale, concernant la situation en Algérie. Le Mouvement Natioinal Algérien et les autres Mouvements similaires avaient invité les Nord-Africains de la région parisienne à se rendre à la Mosquée de Pqris le 9 mars à 13h.

<sup>35</sup> Davidson. *Only Muslim*, 145.

<sup>36</sup> Centre Culturel Algérie (CCA) *El Moudjahid*, December 1960 "l'Antisemitisme: Cheval de Bataille du Colonialisme"

<sup>37</sup> CCA *El Moudjahid*, December 1960 "l'Antisemitisme: Cheval de Bataille du Colonialisme"

Original French text : Depuis 20 siècles, les juifs sont installés en Algérie. Au moment où les pires persécutions leur étaient réservées en Europe, c'est l'Afrique du Nord, terre de tolérance, qui accueillit les juifs, chassés d'Espagne.

<sup>38</sup> Davidson. *Only Muslim*, 136. Originally cited in Benjamin Stora, *Les Trois exils: Juifs d'Algérie*.

- <sup>39</sup> Davidson. *Only Muslim*, 137.
- <sup>40</sup> Shepard. *Voices of Decolonization*, 97-99.
- <sup>41</sup> Macmaster. *Burning the Veil*, 328.
- <sup>42</sup> Lazreg. *Torture and the Twilight of Empire*, 78. Originally cited in *On nous appelait fellaghas* (Paris: Stock, 1976), 55, 57, 58.
- <sup>43</sup> Gerald, Davis. *Algerian Diary: Frank Kearns and the "Impossible Assignment" for CBS News* (Morgantown: West Virginia University Press, 2016), 84.
- <sup>44</sup> Davidson. *Only Muslim*, 150.
- <sup>45</sup> Davidon, *Only Muslim*, 134.
- <sup>46</sup> Davidson, *Only Muslim*, 134.
- <sup>47</sup> Shepard. *The Invention of Decolonization*, 186-187.
- <sup>48</sup> Macmaster. *Burning the Veil*, 38.
- <sup>49</sup> Macmaster. *Burning the Veil*, 38.
- <sup>50</sup> Macmaster. *Burning the Veil*, 39. Originally in *Al Manar*, 24 July, 1953
- <sup>51</sup> Lazreg. *Torture and the Twilight of Empire*, 150.
- <sup>52</sup> Lazreg. *Torture and the Twilight of Empire*, 151.
- <sup>53</sup> Lazreg. *Torture and the Twilight of Empire*, 149.
- <sup>54</sup> "Battle of the Veil" July 13, 1958 <http://www.nytimes.com/1958/07/13/archives/battle-of-the-veil-in-algeria-an-ancient-symbol-of-subservience-is.html>
- <sup>55</sup> Shepard. *The Invention of Decolonization*, 190.
- <sup>56</sup> Shepard. *The Invention of Decolonization*, 186
- <sup>57</sup> Shepard. *The Invention of Decolonization*, 187
- <sup>58</sup> Shepard. *The Invention of Decolonization*, 189.
- <sup>59</sup> Horne, Alistaire. *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962* (New York: New York Review of Books, 1977), 184.
- <sup>60</sup> Horne. *A Savage War of Peace*, 185.
- <sup>61</sup> Fanon, Frantz. *A Dying Colonialism* (New York: Publishers Group West, 1965 English Translation), 58, 61.
- <sup>62</sup> It's interesting that she refers to those of European descent born in Algeria as Algerian instead of using the term "Pied Noir." This might suggest a camaraderie since the speaker is choosing refer to these other women as Algerian (suggesting that they too had the right to be designated as such regardless of ancestry).
- <sup>63</sup> People from the city of Oran, Algeria
- <sup>64</sup> CCA *El Moudjahid Spécial 1er Novembre, 1960 Femmes Algeriennes Dans la Guerre*  
Original French text: El Moudjahid : Avec qui étiez-vous en contact dans votre travail de militante ?  
Réponse : Avec des Algériens et avec des Algériennes d'origine européenne. Ma présence au sein de l'organisation été pour certains Oranais non encore engagés un étonnement puisqu'une jeune fille instruite avait choisi de quitter sa famille et de vivre dans la clandestinité... Nous avons été arrêtées très tôt, et c'est notre arrestation qui a révélé au public que des Algériennes musulmanes et européennes militaient ensemble. Les policiers étaient étonnés d'avoir affaire à une « musulmane intellectuelle ». Ils ont essayé de nous faire de la propagande sur la France libératrice des femmes musulmanes, etc...
- <sup>65</sup> CCA *El Moudjahid Spécial 1er Novembre, 1960 Femmes Algeriennes Dans la Guerre*  
Original French text : El Moudjahid : Et quel est votre avis le problème essentiel ?  
Réponse : Dans l'immédiat, les femmes devront continuer à bien élever leurs enfants, mais celles qui en seront capables devront éduquer les autres femmes. El Moudjahid : Et le rôle politique des femmes ? Réponse : Nous savions que toutes les femmes algériennes allaient devoir participer à la reconstruction du pays. Nous pensions que, par le fait seul de leur rôle dans la société, les femmes ont des droits et que ces droits leur seraient d'autant plus largement reconnus qu'elles avaient participé à la lutte commune.
- <sup>66</sup> Macmaster. *Burning the Veil*, 331.
- <sup>67</sup> The Algerian Resistance (this word previously referred to the French Resistance during WWII)
- <sup>68</sup> CCA *La Voix du Peuple* November 1960 "Le Role de la Femme Musulmane dans la Révolution Algérienne"

Original French text: Cette curieuse entrée de la femme musulmane algérienne dans le combat qui va sans aucun doute la libérer et libérer le pays est un processus digne d'attention. L'on commençait à voir des jeunes filles dans les universités ; le MNA organisait cette jeunesse en vue de préparer l'élite de demain...la femme a participé à la lutte en devenant le chef de famille ; elle remplaça dignement le père, l'époux et le frère. Elle est allée, elle aussi, au maquis...elle a été torturée ; elle a donné souffert dans sa personne...elle s'est donc affranchie dans la lutte : la lutte politique et révolutionnaire. C'est dans le cadre de notre passé historique, de notre civilisation et de la religion islamique que nous allons puiser et parfaire cette évolution de la femme musulmane algérienne. L'avenir est à nous...les hommes ainsi, la femme musulmane algérienne peut être fière d'avoir conquis sa place dans le combat et participer à la libération nationale.

<sup>69</sup> MacMaster. *Burning the Veil*, 336.

<sup>70</sup> Bowen. *Why the French Don't Like Headscarves*, 67.

<sup>71</sup> Saadia. Manu. "The 1961 massacre that could help us understand the Paris attacks," *Splinter*, November 15, 2015, accessed November 26, 2016, <https://splinternews.com/the-1961-massacre-that-could-help-us-understand-the-par-1793852874>